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Abstract 
State-based processes for determining refugee claims are crucial sites of inclusion 
or exclusion for onshore refugee applicants. This paper argues that cultures of 
disbelief and exclusion towards onshore refugee applicants are increasingly being 
enacted indirectly, via procedural reforms to Refugee Status Determination (RSD), 
which limit the ability of applicants to establish and articulate their claims. Focusing 
on Australia and Canada, this paper tracks the acceleration and truncation of RSD 
procedures, which first reflect and then frequently achieve the exclusion of onshore 
applicants. Two sets of reforms in particular have profoundly limited the terms on 
which applicants may present their claims. In Canada, this occurred as the result of 
a major overhaul of RSD that took place in December 2012. In Australia, the policy 
of ‘enhanced screening’ of applicants achieves the immediate screening-out of 
certain claims from the Australian determination system. Alongside analysing these 
reforms as a means of exclusion, this paper argues that the new procedures most 
disadvantage applicants making claims on the basis of gender-related persecution. 
Key words 
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Resumen 
Los procesos estatales para resolver las concesiones de asilo son situaciones 
cruciales para la inclusión o exclusión de los solicitantes de asilo una vez están en 
el territorio de acogida. Este artículo defiende que cada vez más, se está 
promulgando indirectamente la cultura de la desconfianza y exclusión hacia los 
solicitantes de asilo, a través de reformas procesuales de la Determinación del 
Estatus de Refugiado (DER), lo que limita la capacidad de los solicitantes para 
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establecer y articular sus demandas de asilo. Centrándose en Australia y Canadá, 
este artículo realiza un seguimiento de la aceleración y el truncamiento de los 
procedimientos de DER que primero reflejan y después a menudo consiguen la 
exclusión de los solicitantes en el propio territorio de acogida. Dos grupos de 
reformas en particular han limitado profundamente las condiciones en las que los 
demandantes pueden presentar sus solicitudes. En Canadá esto ocurrió debido a 
una revisión importante de DER que se dio en diciembre de 2012. En Australia, la 
política de cribado mejorado de los solicitantes consigue la exclusión inmediata de 
determinadas solicitudes del sistema de determinación australiano. Además de 
analizar estas reformas como medio de exclusión, este artículo defiende que los 
nuevos procedimientos perjudican especialmente a los demandantes que realizan la 
solicitud en base a una persecución por motivos de género. 
Palabras clave 
Migración; derecho de refugiados; daño por cuestiones de género; política de 
frontera; Canadá; Australia; determinación del estatus de refugiado 
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1. Introduction 
State-based processes for determining refugee claims are crucial sites of inclusion 
or exclusion for onshore refugee applicants. The procedural details and content of 
refugee status determination (RSD) are the subject of an expanding literature, 
which deals with the legal, political and social context of how state institutions 
evaluate asylum claims. Such claims are generally made under the Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), and in most instances, a particular 
state’s domestic enactment of this document. For at least 10 years now, academic 
commentators and advocates have realised the importance of procedural elements 
of RSD in determining who gets access to state protection and on what terms. As a 
consequence, refugee status determination processes in ‘refugee-receiving’ states 
have been the subject of closer scrutiny and critique. These critiques present status 
determination at the lower levels of decision-making as just as important, and in 
some cases more important than overall jurisprudence about who may access 
refugee protection and on what terms.  
For the most part, these critiques of RSD have addressed the interpretation and 
assessment of claims and evidence once a refugee applicant has entered into the 
process. Such work has focused on the persistent problem of unfair or unduly 
sceptical credibility assessments. The identification of a ‘culture of disbelief’ in 
relation to refugee applicants and their evidence is a common feature across a 
significant number of refugee decision-making studies. The institutions responsible 
for refugee status determination have, for example, been described as 
characterised by ‘adversarial posturing’ (Kneebone 1998), a ‘culture of disbelief’ 
(Ensor et al. 2006, Millbank 2009, Sweeney 2009, Souter 2011), and a 
‘presumptive scepticism’ (Byrne 2007). Significantly, scholars and advocates have 
argued that these cultures of disbelief reflect a view of RSD as performing a gate-
keeping function, the ultimate aim of which is to ensure that ‘fraudulent’, 
‘opportunistic’ or bogus claimants do not gain access to the state or to state 
protection (Kneebone 1998, Rousseau et al. 2002, Glass 2008).  
In this paper, my aim is to examine how these cultures of disbelief, persistently 
identified as structuring the interpretation and determination of claims, are 
currently being enacted via procedural reforms to the RSD process. I argue that the 
acceleration and truncation of RSD processes both reflect and then achieve the 
exclusion and disbelief that characterise refugee decision-making. That is, the 
culture of disbelief identified as being present in the institutional culture of RSD 
bodies, is increasingly being achieved via procedural limits on refugee applicants’ 
ability to speak and to be heard.  
In both Australia and Canada, significant procedural reforms have so limited RSD 
timelines and the terms on which refugee applicants may have their claims heard 
and reviewed, that the notion that a refugee applicant has the opportunity to 
present a claim and to be heard in good faith comes close to existing as a conceit 
only. The context and details of the reforms in each country differ significantly. 
Their result, however, is to limit the capacity for refugees to speak, and to present 
their claims. Consequently, certain applicants achieve their own exclusion when 
their claims are rejected. That is, although refugees are given the opportunity to 
access status determination processes, because of procedural barriers to making a 
successful claim in the first instance, they fail. Applicants are both excluded from 
the status of refugee and confirmed as ‘illegitimate’ refugee applicants.  
In this paper I explore the procedural barriers to refugee applicants articulating a 
claim as a result of these recent reforms in Australia and Canada, with a particular 
focus on the timing of RSD. In section two, I sketch the broader context in which 
these reforms have taken place, including significant reforms in other jurisdictions, 
‘speeding up’ of the asylum process and some of the implications of these reforms 
for female applicants and those making gender-based claims. Section three 
explores the major overhaul of Canadian RSD that took place in December 2012. 
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The reforms, under Bill C-31 entitled the ‘Protecting Canada’s Immigration System 
Act’, introduced a system of determination whereby claimants with the most 
comprehensive access to the RSD system will have their claim determined within 
two months of initiating an application. Section four examines the policy of 
‘enhanced screening’ introduced in Australia in late 2012, and a 2014 policy 
proposal of fast-tracking certain protection applications through the Australian 
determination system.  
I argue that procedural reforms and acceleration of determination processes are 
significant features of contemporary onshore asylum seeking for two reasons. First, 
as a consequence of accelerated and truncated processes, the applicant’s own 
narrative is limited or excluded. The stories of onshore asylum seekers - even as 
mediated by the RSD processes - do not come to exist as a counter-point to official 
discourses about onshore asylum seekers. Exclusion is achieved at a procedural, 
substantive and rhetorical level. Second, over the last 15 years, as a result of 
advocacy and critique, the experiences of female applicants, those making claims 
on the basis of gender-related persecution, and applicants with trauma-related 
mental illnesses have led to significant reforms of RSD. The procedural reforms in 
Australia and Canada, which focus on speed, efficiency and ‘excluding’ unfounded 
claims, will undermine these reforms and most disadvantage those classes of 
applicants already identified as facing difficulty in articulating their claims. 
Literature addressing story telling and the law has shown how the law’s refusal to 
hear or sanction the stories of marginalised groups renders them and their accounts 
invisible and silent (Papke 1991). The exclusion of certain groups’ narratives allows 
the law’s own narratives and stereotypes to prevail over the accounts of those 
raced, gendered or classed as ‘other’ (Matsuda 1987, Delgado 1989, Ewick and 
Silbey 1995). Citing the imperatives of time, speed and efficiency, the procedural 
reforms of RSD processes exclude certain stories from being articulated fully, if at 
all. Those who cannot tell their stories quickly or provide evidence fast enough will 
fail in their applications for protection. Their failures confirm the justifications for 
the reforms, which are explored throughout this piece, that asylum seekers are 
bogus and ‘abuse’ the system. This is not to argue that merely letting the stories be 
heard will lead to greater justice for those entering refugee status determination 
procedures. Rather, this piece aims to highlight how procedural barriers to RSD 
mechanisms work to enact a rhetorical and substantive exclusion of onshore 
refugee applicants. 
Finally, it is worth noting at the outset that distinctions between ‘procedural’ and 
‘substantive’ law and legal reforms are not fixed or settled. I focus here on 
‘procedural’ reforms as rules relating to how a claim is lodged and presented, rather 
than the content of refugee law and jurisprudence, or the assessment of particular 
applicants’ claims. This distinction is useful because while the Australian and 
Canadian Governments both presented the reforms discussed here as achieving 
‘good’ procedural goals, such as speed and efficiency, the reforms have a 
substantive impact on access to protection. This is not to deny that speed and 
efficiency are important components of procedural justice, and that refugee 
applicants may benefit from faster determinations of their claims. Rather, it is to 
argue that these procedural reforms have substantive effects; they should be 
placed within the political context of contemporary refugee policy and existing 
cultures of exclusion and deterrence of onshore refugee applicants. 
2. Speeding up asylum: the broader context of acceleration and the 
implications for gender-related claims  
The reforms discussed in this piece are best understood in the broader context of 
actions taken by wealthy, Global North states to prevent the arrival of onshore 
asylum seekers and to restrict their access to state-based rights to apply for 
refugee status. Nation states’ attempts to exclude and deter onshore asylum 
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seekers have frequently taken the form of physical barriers, put in place to impede 
or prevent the arrival of persons seeking protection. Such means have included the 
tightening of border controls, the expansion of the infrastructure of border 
protection, and implementing immigration controls beyond the borders of the 
territorial state (Edwards 2005, Macklin 2005, Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). 
Governments have also sought to deter onshore refugee applicants through the 
redefinition of sovereign territory as ‘outside’ of the nation state, or by requiring 
refugee applicants to be returned to ‘safe third countries’ (Hyndman and Mountz 
2008). Exclusion via the procedural reform of determination processes should be 
understood as another dimension of these deterrence policies.  
The Australian and Canadian reforms analysed in this piece, shortening refugee 
status determination timelines and limiting the capacity of applicants to present 
their claims, are not new in their approach to RSD procedure. Since the 1990s, 
other jurisdictions have adopted similar reforms. In 2005, Thomas Spijkerboer 
identified what he called the ‘massive acceleration’ of refugee determination 
procedures in the Netherlands and argued that these accelerations exacerbated the 
existing problems of racial and gender stereotyping that commonly frame decision-
makers’ assessments of refugee applicants’ evidence (Spijkerboer 2005). While the 
Netherlands was not the first jurisdiction to accelerate RSD processes (Human 
Rights Watch 2010), Spijkerboer’s work was important as it recognised that these 
temporal reforms would intensify the barriers and stereotyping already experienced 
by applicants, particularly those making claims on the basis of gender-related 
persecution.  
There are also earlier examples of the use of preliminary screening procedures in 
Australia. A 2000 Senate Report into the operation of Australia’s Refugee and 
Humanitarian Program documented a category of ‘removals’ from Australia known 
as ‘turnarounds’ (Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
2000, p. 301-302). These were defined as ‘people who arrive at airports, 
sometimes without the required papers’, who were given the opportunity of 
identifying a need for protection under the Refugees Convention. Where no claim 
was identified, ‘turnarounds’ were generally removed within 72 hours and no 
detailed records were kept of those returned in this manner (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2000, p. 302).1 
One of the most notable policies of procedural acceleration in RSD is the United 
Kingdom’s Detained Fast-Track (DFT) program, which was introduced in 2007. The 
UK Government implemented the DFT as part of the UK’s New Asylum Model, which 
in turn implemented the Home Office’s five-year immigration strategy, “Controlling 
our borders: Making migration work for Britain” (Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 2005).2 The strategy aimed to introduce a ‘faster, more tightly 
managed asylum process’ (Human Rights Watch 2010, p. 10).3 Under the DFT, 
where ‘it appears that a quick decision is possible’ an applicant may be ‘detained for 
a short period, to make a quick decision, which if refused, will ordinarily be subject 
to quick appeal time scales’ (United Kingdom Border Agency (UKBA 2013a). DFT 
asylum applicants are generally interviewed within a day of their detention and are 
                                                 
1 In contrast to existing enhanced screening procedures, which apply predominantly to boat arrivals, 
‘turnarounds’ generally only took place at airports, because the then Department of Immigration and 
Multicultural Affairs deemed it too difficult to enforce the immediate return of those arriving by sea. 
Arrivals were generally sent back with the carrier that brought them to Australia (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2000, p. 302).  
2 Note, since the time of writing the UK High Court found that the DFT appeal process was ultra vires as 
a result of its structural unfairness, and the Court of Appeal rejected the government’s appeal of the 
decision, describing the system as ‘systematically unfair and unjust’ (Detention Action v First-Tier 
Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) and Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) 
and Lord Chancellor [2015] EWC 1689; and [2014] EWCA Civ 1634). 
3 The UK introduced more limited fast track processes in 2000 and 2003, that applied to those applicants 
who were detained and who were single, male and ‘from countries which are believed by the [Home 
Office] to be those where in general there is no serious risk of persecution” (HRW 20). 
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provided with a decision one day after their initial interview (UKBA 2013b, para 
2.1). While an appeal of negative decisions is possible, applicants must file for 
appeal within 2 days of receiving the first instance determination (UKBA 2013b, 
para 2.1). The UK Government designed the entire process to be completed within 
21 days. While there are a number of exceptions in relation to whom may be 
considered for the DFT,4 the assessment of suitability for the entry into the process 
is undertaken by a Border Officer at a screening interview where no substantive 
questions about the claim or the claimant are asked (UKBA 2013a). The reforms in 
both Canada and Australia have been linked to and compared with the UK model 
(Liberal Party of Australia and National Party of Australia 2013, p. 7, Macklin 2013, 
p. 102).  
The UK DFT reforms and the analyses of them provide a perfect case study for the 
kinds of harms women and those making gender-based claims will face under 
‘accelerated’ processes. Female applicants and those who have experienced 
gender-related violence frequently do not disclose incidents of gender-based 
persecution in the first instance, if at all. Researchers across jurisdictions have 
documented the difficulties women face in disclosing sexual harm, including high 
levels of trauma, shame and fear (Baillot et al. 2009, 2012, Berg and Millbank 
2009, Herlihy and Turner 2007). A Human Rights Watch (2010, p. 10) report 
assessed the DFT process as inherently unsuitable for assessing the complex cases 
of both men and women. Human Rights Watch, in their study of the effects of the 
UK’s DFT process on female asylum seekers, found that: 
Once in the DFT procedure, women are on a fast-moving treadmill with structural 
features inhibiting or even preventing them from making their cases effectively. 
When women arrive … they will often have their asylum interview the next day… 
There is little opportunity to build trust, and women, especially in cases involving 
rape or abuse, may only reveal relevant information late in the process, or not at 
all. There is limited opportunity to access expert evidence, such as medical reports 
(Human Rights Watch 2010, p. 3). 
The UK reforms ignore research addressing the difficulties and delays that certain 
claimants experience in being able to articulate past harms, as well as reforms that 
suggest these difficulties should be taken into account when claims are assessed. 
Indeed, in the relatively short history of formal, adjudicated asylum determination, 
much work has been done to recognise and respond to the fact that certain 
claimants face more difficulty than others in presenting and explaining their claims 
and evidence. And at least in theory, if not in practice, states and institutions 
determining refugee status have attempted to address some of these challenges. 
The difficulty of disclosure and the common practice of delayed disclosure in claims 
involving sexual harms, for example, are recognised and accepted not only in the 
critical literature but also in State-produced literature and by State institutions 
responsible for RSD.  As Baillot et al. (2009) note, the notion that gender is of 
importance in asylum determination processes has been recognised in several 
jurisdictions, through the introduction of ‘relatively enlightened’ guidelines on 
gender issues, as well as via UNHCR’s own guidelines, published in 2002, on 
gender-related persecution and the application of the refugee definition (Baillot et 
al. 2009, p. 201).5 This is also evident in the introduction of institutional guidelines 
for the determination of claims made on the basis of sexual orientation (Anker 
2002, LaViolette 2010). 
                                                 
4 A guidance note for the DFT process lists exceptional applicants who will not be considered for the DFT 
process. The list includes women who are more than 24 weeks pregnant, unaccompanied minors seeking 
asylum, those with independent evidence of having being tortured or trafficked and those with a 
disability or care need requiring 24 hour nursing or assistance (United Kingdom Border Agency 2013a). 
5 There are guidelines at the UN level (UNHCR 2002), and in Canada (Immigration and Refugee Board of 
Canada 1996), Australia (Refugee and Migration Review Tribunal 2010) and the USA (US Department of 
State 1996). 
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While the reforms and guidelines addressing gender-related persecution have been 
far from perfect, and inconsistently and unevenly implemented (Black Women’s 
Rape Action Project and Women Against Rape 2006, Ceneda and Palmer 2006, 
LaViolette 2007, 2010), they are significant insofar as they ‘give not only legal but 
also procedural guidelines to decision-makers in relation to dealing sensitively and 
appropriately with women’s narratives of persecution’ (Baillot et al. 2009, p. 201).6 
The guidelines recognise that the process of RSD is a barrier to certain classes of 
applicants and it should be these kinds of applicants who feature at the centre of 
discussions about ‘accelerating’ and ‘enhancing’ existing RSD processes. And yet, as 
a result of the reforms addressed below – governed by the rhetoric ‘speeding up’ 
determinations, process and efficiency – it is those who are already disadvantaged 
by RSD systems who will have the most difficulty meeting the new timelines.  
Existing processes of RSD and the Refugees Convention’s definition of a refugee 
already demand that asylum seekers articulate claims in a particular way and that 
they present evidence of certain kinds of harm over others. Robert Barsky argues 
that asylum seekers must not only meet the limited, legal definition of a refugee, 
but they must also perform a particular kind of ‘refugee’ subjectivity or indeed 
subjectivities, as determined by the receiving State. He argues it is not just the 
content of the refugee claim that is tested but also the claimant’s competency in 
the requirements of the determination process and the style of speech and 
argumentation it demands (Barsky 1994). The remainder of this paper addresses 
how the demand that applicants meet the existing requirements of RSD with even 
less time or opportunity to speak than previously, acts as an indirect yet effective 
means of exclusion. 
3. The ‘Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act’: The Canadian fast-
tracking reforms  
In Canada, Bill C-31 entitled ‘Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act’ enacted 
a major and controversial overhaul of RSD in Canada (Canadian Bar Association 
2012, Canadian Civil Liberties Association 2012).7 The omnibus Bill came into force 
on 15 December 2012. The Bill amends a number of areas of Canadian refugee and 
migration law, including in relation to human smuggling offences, the mandatory 
detention of groups designated as ‘mass arrivals’, and limitations on the right to 
family reunion and access to permanent residency for accepted refugees (see 
Galloway 2014). However, the focus of this section is on the new series of timelines 
and procedural limits the reforms impose on refugee applicants making onshore 
claims. I analyse the new timelines as a means of excluding refugee applicants, as 
well as their evidence and stories, at the same time as preserving the formal right 
to make a protection claim. Although onshore claimants may still seek protection, 
the new timelines will have a profound effect on the ability of refugee applicants to 
present a claim, as well as place serious pressure on decision-makers to determine 
claims as quickly as possible.  
A quick sketch of the details of the legislation gives a sense of just how quickly 
claims will be determined. Timelines apply differently depending on the applicant’s 
country of origin and whether the applicant makes his or her claim at a port of 
entry (POE, such as at a land border or at an airport) or as an ‘inland’ claim, having 
already entered the country on another basis. POE claimants will be required to file 
their comprehensive application document, the Basis of Claim form (BOC), in full 
within 15 days of entering the country. Hearings will then be scheduled within 60 
days of the deadline for returning the BOC, and all evidence must be filed at least 
                                                 
6 These concerns are galvanised in light of British research showing that between 50 and 80 per cent of 
female applicants have experienced some form of sexual violence (Refugee Council 2009, p. 4). 
7 Bill C-31, Protecting Canada’s Immigration System Act, 1st Sess., 41st Parl., 2012 (assented to 28 
June 2012), SC 2012, c. 17. The Bill amended the Balanced Refugee Reform Act (BRRA), SC 2010, c. 8, 
which came into force with the passing of Bill C-31; and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act 
(IRPA), SC 2001, c. 27.  
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10 days before the hearing date (Refugee Protection Division Rules SOR/2012-256 
(RPD Rules), rule 34). For applicants making an inland claim, the BOC form must 
be returned at the time of the initial eligibility interview, which (circularly) will take 
place when the BOC is completed (Immigration and Refugee Protection 
Regulations SOR/2002-227 (IRPR), reg. 159.8). While on the face of it, this gives 
the applicant unlimited time to complete the BOC form, legal aid and full welfare 
entitlements will not be available until after the eligibility interview. As such, 
advocates assisting the claimant will not be able to confirm that funding for legal 
assistance is available until after the BOC has been submitted (Showler 2012). The 
hearing for inland applicants must also take place within 60 days of referral to the 
Immigration Review Board (IRB)(IRPR, reg. 159).  
The reforms envisage that the applicant will set out the ‘full story’ in the initial 
application form and the applicant must verify the form is ‘complete, true and 
correct’ (Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada 2012). Completing the BOC 
form requires the applicant to set out ‘everything that is important for your claim’ 
and the applicant must highlight how every subsequent change to the BOC differs 
from the claim expressed in the original form (RPD Rules, rule 9). This is 
particularly significant as credibility assessment continues to turn, in part, upon the 
consistency of the applicant’s account of his or her evidence (Millbank 2009, 
Sweeney 2009). Peter Showler notes that in the past, eliciting the applicant’s 
narrative of events has required at least two meetings with counsel to interview the 
claimant, usually with an interpreter present and the use of translation services for 
important pieces of evidence (Showler 2012, p. 6). It is difficult to conceive how an 
applicant will have time to secure representation (and legal aid where necessary) 
and complete and return this form within two weeks of entry. The date for the 
hearing will be determined when the claimant enters the country or at the eligibility 
interview for inland claimants. In most instances this date may only be modified to 
another date within the existing 60-day limit (RPD Rules, rule 54(5)).  
However, by far the shortest time periods for filing and finalising a claim attach to 
applicants from a list of ‘Designated Countries of Origin’ (DCOs), a further major 
reform introduced by Bill C-31. Under the DCO reforms, the Minister may exercise a 
discretionary power to designate certain countries as ‘safe’. Applicants from these 
states will be subject to even shorter determination timelines and very limited 
appeal mechanisms (Bill C-31, clause 58, Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, 
s. 109.1). Specifically, hearings for applicants from these countries will take place 
within 30 days (inland claimants) or within 45 days (POE claimants) of referral to 
the IRB (IRPR 159.9). Applicants from the DCO list, also known as the ‘Safe 
Country of Origin’ list, will have no access at all to an administrative appeal, which 
is ordinarily conducted on the papers by the Refugee Appeal Division (Bill C-31, 
clause 36(1), IRPA, s. 110(2)(d.1)).8 As such, for applicants from certain countries, 
all fact-finding will be finalised within six weeks.  
The speed of status determination was at the centre of the Canadian Government’s 
justifications for the introduction of the DCO list (CIC 2012b). The Citizenship and 
Immigration Canada (CIC) website declares that ‘too much time and too many 
resources are spent reviewing these unfounded claims’ (CIC 2012b). The site 
further explains that refugee claimants from these countries will have their claims 
‘processed fast’ which will ensure that those who need it ‘get protection fast’ and 
those with unfounded claims ‘are sent home quickly through expedited processing’ 
(CIC 2012b). As noted, speed and efficiency are not, on their own, negative 
features of RSD. However, in the case of Bill C-31, fast processing times are 
deployed cynically. The need for speedy determinations is articulated alongside 
claims that refugee claims are unfounded. And, in the examples examined here, 
                                                 
8 The applicant may appeal to the Canadian Federal Court for judicial review, but there will be no 
automatic stay on removal of the applicant if an appeal is filed. The applicant must also apply to the 
Court for a stay to prevent removal before the appeal is heard (IRPR, regulation 231(2)).  
Anthea Vogl  A Matter of Time: Enacting the Exclusion of Onshore… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 6, n. 1 (2016), 137-162 
ISSN: 2079-5971 146 
efficiency-focused reforms are attended by expansions of executive discretion (such 
as Ministerial designations of DCOs) to counter the alleged abuse of RSD systems. 
The new timelines will impede the ability of applicants to gather any necessary 
evidence and seek expert opinion or witnesses where necessary, in order to have 
the fairest and best possible chance at shaping their stories in a manner that 
accords with the demands of Canadian refugee law. This is particularly troubling in 
an area of decision-making that has already been identified as one of the most 
difficult, precisely as a result of the lack of other kinds of evidence available 
(Rousseau et al. 2002). Indeed, the pressure and strain on applicants giving oral 
testimony will necessarily be exacerbated by the reforms. As Catherine Dauvergne 
(2013) notes:  
[T]hose seeking protection must now complete their initial paperwork within 15 
days. This will not be possible. Forms will be incomplete and inaccurate … Decision 
makers will have to rely on less information than ever before. This will lead to more 
mistakes. In refugee decision making, errors cost lives. 
Critically, burdening applicants with tight timelines and procedural hurdles occurs 
while the substance of RSD law remains intact. The truncation and acceleration of 
RSD processes place great faith in Canadian status determinations bodies, which 
are presented as reliable, efficient and effective. On the other hand, those making 
protection visa applications are presented as insincere, exploitative and 
burdensome. The RSD changes both reflect and create a culture of exclusion, and 
fit in neatly with previous observations about cultures of disbelief directed at status 
determination bodies. The reforms constrain the ability of applicants to speak, as 
well as how claims are received and heard when they are articulated. Claims must 
be made quickly, without basic procedural guarantees and in a context where 
applicants from DCOs are judged as wasting (Canadians’) time when presenting 
their claims in full. According to the CIC, the aim of the DCO list is to deter the 
‘abuse of the refugee system by people who come from countries generally 
considered safe’ (CIC 2012b). The text on the Canadian departmental site also 
argues that ‘[m]ost Canadians recognise that there are places in the world where it 
is less likely for a person to be persecuted compared to other areas. Yet many 
persons from these places try to claim asylum in Canada, but are later found not to 
need protection’ (CIC 2012b). 
The process of designating countries as safe is an entirely discretionary act, based 
on the Immigration Minister’s view, once countries of origin meet rather slippery 
threshold criteria. This gives the Canadian State the power to decide (and revise at 
any point) which State nationals will be subject to the accelerated/truncated 
process. The Minister’s non-reviewable designation may be applied if a State meets 
quantitative and qualitative criteria (BRRA s. 12, IRPA s. 109.1). To trigger a 
quantitative designation, a country must meet the threshold of a combined 
rejection, withdrawal and abandonment rate of asylum claims at the IRB of 75 per 
cent or higher; or a combined withdrawal and abandonment rate of asylum claims 
at the IRB of 60 per cent or higher.9 Qualitative criteria apply to countries where, in 
all of the preceding three years, no more than 30 claims for Canadian asylum from 
that country were finalised. Countries must meet the qualitative criteria of the 
existence of an independent judicial system; and the recognition of basic 
democratic rights and freedoms, including mechanisms for redress; and the 
                                                 
9 In 2011 there were over 80 countries whose nationals lodged fewer than 30 claims in Canada 
(Puddicombe 2012, p. 4). Canadian lawyer and advocate, Warren Puddicombe’s critique of the 
designation trigger criteria points to the arbitrariness and misleading nature of the numerical criteria, the 
vagueness of the qualitative criteria and the capacity for countries to be designated which might have 
overall ‘good’ records as rule of law and human rights respecting states but where certain minority 
groups still face serious and ongoing risk of persecution without state protection (Puddicombe 2012). For 
an analysis of the misleading nature of the Canadian Immigration and Review Board statistics 
representing abandoned or withdrawn claims in regards to Hungary in particular, see Macklin (2013, p. 
115). See also Dauvergne (2012). 
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existence of civil society organisations, to be triggered for potential designation. In 
each instance, the Canadian Minister for Immigration has sole discretion to make 
the final decision regarding designation.  
At the time of writing, 37 countries were on the ‘safe’ countries list (CIC 2012b). 
The designation of entire nations as safe for all persons raises major issues, 
including but not limited to the failure to analyse applicants’ claims on a case-by-
case basis; the apparent prejudgment of certain claims; and the potential 
marginalising of persecution of minority groups carried out by non-state actors (see 
further Costello 2005, Puddicombe 2012, Macklin 2013). Even though many of the 
States on the DCO list are generally understood as ‘Western democracies’, and so 
are attended by the assumption that they are not ‘refugee producing’, there are 
nominal democracies on the list that certainly do not fit this assumption. For 
example, the Canadian Minister for Immigration has designated Mexico, Chile and 
Hungary. North Korea is also on the list. Mexico and Hungary, in particular, are two 
of Canada’s largest ‘refugee-sending’ states.10 Their inclusion on the list comes after 
attempts to limit Mexican and Czech applicants’ ability to seek asylum in Canada by 
introducing new, harsher visa requirements for visitors from both countries in 2009 
(Eggenschwiler 2010, Gilbert 2013). Audrey Macklin notes, the political context for 
the reforms’ introduction also included the disproportionate representation of 
Hungarian Roma among asylum seekers in Canada and a desire to stem these 
arrivals (Macklin 2013, p. 101). 
The Minister for Immigration said of Hungary that 98 per cent of Hungarian refugee 
claimants around the world choose to make their claims in Canada though they 
have unrestricted access to dozens of countries around the world and that ‘virtually 
none of them turn out to be well-founded’ (CBC News 2012).  
The DCO list puts into effect the view that those seeking asylum lack credibility on 
a country-by-country basis. CIC do not mince words in relation to this view, 
claiming in support of the reforms that ‘Canada is currently receiving a 
disproportionately high number of asylum claimants who come from countries that 
historically have very low acceptance rates at the independent Immigration and 
Refugee Board of Canada (IRB)’ (CIC 2012a). Refugee applicants are presented as 
initiating unfounded claims as a means of gaining entry to Canada’s sovereign 
territory. The time limits and procedural restrictions feed into constructions of 
onshore applicants as opportunistic but also as an economic drain on the state, and 
on those who are legitimately within the bounds of the state (Pratt and Valverde 
2002).11 In justification of the DCO reforms, the CIC departmental website states, 
‘too many tax dollars are spent on asylum claimants who are not in need of 
protection’ (CIC 2012a). In this sense, the process must not just go faster because 
faster is better and cheaper (and cheaper is better), it must go faster because 
applicants are viewed to be abusing the system from the outset.  
From the 1990s onwards, a host of European states introduced ‘white lists’, which 
functioned similarly to DCOs (Costello 2005, Macklin 2013, p. 103).12 The Canadian 
Government cited these white lists as both a justification and a precedent for 
Canada’s reforms (CIC 2012a).13 Notably, the most common reason for referring 
UK asylum claims to the DFT process is that applicants are from a country 
                                                 
10 Prior to the reforms, Hungary was Canada’s ‘highest’ refugee sending country by a significant margin 
and Mexico was in the top five (CIC 2010).  
11 Another key aspect of the DCO reforms, not discussed in detail here, involves denying DCO applicants 
work permits for six months, access to public health care unless they pose a risk to public health 
(Puddicombe 2012) 
12 As Macklin notes, the EU Qualification Directive authorises Member States to use SCO lists in their 
national asylum regimes ‘and contemplates the adoption of a common EU-level list of safe countries to 
which all Member states would subscribe. 
13 The states me mentioned on the Citizenship and Immigration Canada website as examples of other 
countries with safe country lists include the United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Switzerland, Belgium and Finland (CIC 2012b).  
Anthea Vogl  A Matter of Time: Enacting the Exclusion of Onshore… 
 
Oñati Socio-legal Series, v. 6, n. 1 (2016), 137-162 
ISSN: 2079-5971 148 
designated as safe (Home Office Research and Statistics Directorate 2012). In open 
prejudgment, these UK cases are deemed to be ‘clearly unfounded’ prior to 
assessment, unless it can be shown they are ‘not clearly unfounded’ (Nationality 
Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (UK) s.94). In addition to their potential referral 
to the DFT process, UK asylum applicants from designated ‘safe countries’ may only 
appeal their asylum decision from outside the UK (Home Office Research and 
Statistics Directorate 2012).    
Macklin argues that the ‘logic animating [safe country of origin] lists is that asylum 
seekers from designated States are opportunistic migrants exploiting the refugee 
system (including its slow pace) to circumvent more restrictive regimes for non-
citizens’ (Macklin 2013, p. 102). What is significant here is that improving efficiency 
is synonymous with rejecting a greater number of claims, or preventing them from 
being initiated altogether, rather than the efficient determination of all lodged 
applications. Only five months after the reforms were introduced, the Canadian 
Immigration Minister stated in a press release that the new system had ‘proven to 
be successful, as claims from designated countries of origin [had] decreased by 91 
percent when compared to the same time period over the last six years’ (CIC 
2013).  
The assumption that applicants from non-DCO countries are not genuine is subtler 
than the above statements. Nonetheless, the generally applicable tightening of RSD 
processes was justified as countering ‘abuse of the system’ (CIC 2013). Justification 
for the entire bundle of reforms was at once based on notions of economics and 
efficiency, and on discourses of asylum seekers as bogus and abusing the system. 
These factors work in tandem to create a system of processing that enacts and 
then, through an unfair process, excludes certain onshore claimants. 
All of the timelines may only be varied in exceptional cases. While the hearing and 
return of BOC dates may be varied for ‘reasons of fairness and natural justice’ 
(IRPR, reg 159.9), there are no grounds for an extension due to the basis of the 
claim. The submission date of the BOC and the hearing may be extended for 
‘medical reasons’ but the applicant must submit a medical certificate and/or 
evidence of a medical condition without delay and within the existing time limit (for 
the BOC, 15 days for POE claimants) (RPD Rules, rule 8). The new rules allow the 
date of the hearing to be changed and extended for up to ten days beyond the set 
date, where the applicant is a ‘vulnerable person’ and makes an application in 
writing at least three days prior to the set date (RPD Rules, rule 54(4)).  
These exceptions raise a number of issues – and most significantly, they make no 
mention of gender, gender-based claims or the gender guidelines. The definition of 
a vulnerable person includes those ‘who have suffered gender-related 
persecution’.14 However, vulnerable applicants can only apply for a hearing to be 
delayed by up to 10 days. The processes for a ‘medical’ extension will be difficult to 
complete without an advocate, and there is no guarantee the extension will be 
granted or that applicants will have an advocate at the early stages of their claim or 
in the first two weeks of entry. Even where an advocate is involved, there will be 
little time to gather evidence in support of claims that a client has a medical 
condition or is ‘vulnerable’, in order to achieve an extension.  
                                                 
14 ‘Vulnerable person’ means a person who has ‘been identified as vulnerable under the Chairperson 
Guideline 8: Procedures with Respect to Vulnerable Persons Appearing Before the IRB’ (RPD Rules, rule 
1). Under the guideline vulnerable persons are ‘individuals whose ability to present their cases before 
the IRB is severely impaired’ and ‘such persons may include, but would not be limited to, the mentally 
ill, minors, the elderly, victims of torture, survivors of genocide and crimes against humanity, women 
who have suffered gender-related persecution, and individuals who have been victims of persecution 
based on sexual orientation and gender identity’ (Guideline 8, section 1). Counsel for a person who 
wishes to be identified as a vulnerable person must make an application under the Rules, though the IRB 
will be sensitive to the difficulties faced by self-represented persons and will waive or modify the 
requirements as appropriate. The IRB may also act on its own initiative (Guideline 8, section 7). 
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The procedural limitations and timelines constrain, and in certain cases preclude, 
the ability for claims to be made. Like those applicants who are ‘screened out’ or 
fast-tracked through Australian processes, discussed in the next section, applicants 
from these countries will not be able to collect their thoughts or their evidence in 
order to articulate their claims in the manner required by Canadian RSD. As a 
result, their hastened and incomplete claims may come to act as proof that genuine 
and successful asylum seekers do not come from these States. The reforms 
communicate to individual decision-makers the ‘executive’s prejudgment of the 
merits of individual cases’, compromising both the appearance and reality of 
adjudicative independence (Macklin 2013, p. 103). The rules and regulations make 
no specific mention of those who have experienced gender or sexuality related 
persecution. They do not make any exceptions for delayed disclosure in 
circumstances involving sexual harms, nor do they incorporate any of the existing 
guidelines about difficulties in remembering and articulating evidence, or the shame 
experienced by those making gender based claims (Baillot et al. 2009).  
While refugee applicants have always been required to speak on the State’s terms, 
these changes place even greater pressure on applicants to tell the right story as 
quickly, coherently, and as soon as possible. For those from DCOs, the realities of 
processing, including the requirement that a claim be finalised within 45 days of its 
filing, without access to administrative appeal processes, amounts to saying there 
is no claim at all. The Canadian Government’s repeated justification for this reform, 
being that DCOs ‘do not normally produce refugees’, leaves individual claimants on 
shortened timelines in a situation where they are already understood as unlikely to 
be refugees (CIC 2013). Negative determinations, then, which reinforce these 
constructions, should not and will not come as a surprise.  
The RSD reforms, as well as the other amendments made by Bill C-31, take place 
in the context of Canada’s historical place as a ‘best practice’ example for the 
treatment of refugee and humanitarian entrants. In 2009 Macklin compared 
Canada’s reputation as an ‘especially welcome haven for refugees’, and its liberal 
interpretation of the Refugees Convention with an increasing practice of keeping 
refugees ‘out of earshot’, such that those who fall within the refugee definition 
cannot access the system (Macklin 2009, p. 94). The reforms to RSD under Bill C-
31 are in line with Macklin’s observations about increasing constraints on asylum 
seekers’ right to be heard in Canada. They complement reforms described by 
Macklin in 2009, making it near ‘impossible for prospective asylum seekers to travel 
lawfully to Canada,’ by limiting access to Canadian RSD once applicants arrive 
(Macklin 2009, p. 105). Donald Galloway echoes this assessment of the Bill C-31 
reforms, arguing that their procedural amendments constitute a ‘radical and 
revisionary shift in [Canadian] refugee law and the processes of refugee status 
determination,’ such that the legal concept of the refugee is altered ‘as radically as 
it would be by substantive redefinition’ (Galloway 2014, pp. 39, 38). This shift and 
erosion of rights in Canada takes place in contrast to Australian refugee policy, 
which has for some time been associated with ‘restrictive and deterrent’ practices 
and with attempts to quarantine executive power over refugee applicants from 
judicial oversight and interference (Kneebone 2009, p. 172). The Australian practice 
of ‘enhanced screening’, which accords with these trends, is examined in detail in 
the following section. 
4. ‘Enhanced’ screening and RSD: accelerated ‘Screening-Out’ and 
decision-making processes in Australia  
The ‘screening-in’ of asylum applicants is a critical part of RSD processes and takes 
place in most refugee receiving States. Such screening-in processes usually involve 
border or customs officials establishing whether or not a person is seeking to make 
an asylum claim. It is usually a peremptory event, as the official generally does not 
have the power to determine the claim to asylum. If a person is ‘screened in’ and 
deemed to be seeking asylum, the requirement of non-refoulement under the 
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Refugees Convention is invoked, such that a State may not directly or indirectly 
return a person to any place where that person’s life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a 
particular social group or political opinion (Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees 1951, article 33).  
Under other international law obligations, a State has a duty not to refoule any 
person to a place where that person would face a real risk of irreparable harm by 
way of torture, or cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment, punishment, deprivation 
of life, or the death penalty (Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, 
Convention Against Torture 1984, International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 1966, see further Lauterpacht and Bethlehem 2003). The obligation applies 
to asylum seekers before they are assessed, who may gain refugee status but have 
not yet done so, and it is not subject to any exceptions. While the Refugees 
Convention is silent on the question of the precise process by which claims are to 
be determined, in order to meet the duty of non-refoulement, a state must use a 
reliable process to determine any claim to protection (UNHCR 2011, p. 37).15 
In October 2012, the Australian government implemented an ‘enhanced screening 
process’ for Sri Lankan people arriving by boat without authorisation and in late 
2013, extended this process to also apply to Vietnamese arrivals (Olle 2013a). 
Crucially, under the ‘enhanced’ process, those arriving by boat from countries 
designated by Department of Immigration and Border Protection officials can be 
immediately ‘screened out’ of the refugee status determination process and 
deported, with no further opportunity to present their claims.  
From October 2012 to February 2013, enhanced screening of Sri Lankan arrivals 
took place without the knowledge of the Australian public or media (Reilly and La 
Forgia 2013). The persistent inquiries of opposition and minority parties during 
Parliament forced the government to reveal that the process originally targeted Sri 
Lankan arrivals on the basis of a ‘pronounced rise in arrivals’ from Sri Lanka from 
October to December 2012. The Government also revealed that Sri Lanka was 
chosen on the basis of its status as a prominent refugee-sending state, rather than 
on the basis that Sri Lankans are unlikely to be found to be Convention refugees 
(Reilly and La Forgia 2013, p. 143, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates 2013, p. 
33). 
Like the Canadian DCO reforms, this ‘enhanced’ screening process is applied at the 
discretion of the executive, though the process in Australia has taken place solely 
as an executive measure, rather than as a statutory reform. Due to the nature and 
speed of the enhanced process, usually occurring within the first week of arrival, as 
well as its recent introduction, it has been subject to very little scrutiny or analysis.  
The basis for the designation of certain countries of origin for ‘enhanced screening’ 
in Australia has been even less transparent than the Canadian DCO designation 
process. Although currently the policy only applies to Sri Lankan and Vietnamese 
applicants, the Australian Immigration Minister has stated that the government 
intends to use the procedure in relation to other source countries (Morrison 2013). 
One of the main factors influencing the designation of countries will be whether the 
Government is able to establish repatriation arrangements with particular source 
countries (Morrison 2013).  
A focus on enhanced screening procedures is particularly significant in the 
Australian context, where the executive has moved to exclude refugee applicants 
from Australian territory altogether, by sending refugee applicants ‘offshore’ to the 
                                                 
15 The UNHCR Handbook (2011), which does deal with questions of procedure sets out that: ‘(i) The 
competent official … to whom the applicant addresses himself at the border or in the territory of a 
Contracting state should have clear instructions for dealing with cases which might come within the 
purview of the relevant international instruments. He should be required to act in accordance with the 
principle of non-refoulement and to refer such cases to a higher authority’ Handbook at 37. The 
Handbook does not directly address screening out practices in these circumstances. 
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Australian territory of Christmas Island and to Papua New Guinea and Nauru 
(Taylor 2005, Kneebone 2006, Foster and Pobjoy 2011). To date, enhanced 
screening reforms have been far less visible than the off-shoring of refugee 
applicants, or physical policies of deterrence. Enhanced screening applies 
secretively to refugee applicants who reach Australian territory (Foster and Pobjoy 
2011). The policy aims to exclude those who appear to have reached Australia, and 
thereby achieved partial inclusion and potential access to protection. However, for 
those summarily returned, the absence of basic procedural rights and access to 
ordinary RSD undermines the significance of their arrival.16 
In terms of providing applicants with a reasonable opportunity to state that they 
would like to access protection, what is most significant about the enhanced 
screening process is that the applicant is not informed of his or right to seek asylum 
(Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee 2013) or 
the right to legal assistance, and applicants are generally interviewed as soon as 
possible after they arrive. Under the enhanced process, Immigration Department 
officials with experience in refugee protection visa decision-making determine 
whether or not a person invokes Australia’s obligations (Taylor 2013). Government 
ministers describe the enhanced screening process as involving two steps. The first 
being an initial interview, where a government officer must make a preliminary 
finding about whether the interviewee engages Australia’s obligations under the 
Refugees Convention or other treaties (Taylor 2013). Then, as Savitri Taylor (2013) 
explains: 
The information is then forwarded to a more senior departmental officer for review, 
usually on the same day. If the senior officer agrees with the initial finding, it is 
confirmed. If the senior officer disagrees with the initial finding, the case is referred 
to a second senior officer for another opinion. If the two senior officers disagree on 
whether an individual should be screened-out or not, the individual receives the 
“benefit of the doubt” and is “screened-in”. 
If ‘screened out’, applicants will not be given another chance to present their claim. 
Arrivals who are screened out by the enhanced process are found not to raise 
Australia’s non-refoulement obligations. They may be immediately returned to their 
country of origin without being given access to Australia’s ordinary refugee status 
determination mechanisms. They are not given access to administrative or judicial 
review of ‘screening-out’ decisions or access to legal assistance unless they ask for 
it directly (Australian Human Rights Commission 2013a).  
The Immigration Department reported that only applicants who ask for legal help 
are given ‘reasonable facilities’ to contact a legal advisor, where ‘reasonable 
facilities’ include a telephone, a phonebook and an interpreter if necessary 
(Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Legislation Committee 2013, p. 
62). No further information is provided to the applicant. Somewhat obviously, like 
with Canada’s shortened timelines, applicants have no opportunity to arrange 
medical or expert opinions in order to support the claim being made – including in 
relation to the applicant’s ability to competently present his or her claim.  
As at November 2013, the Department had returned to Sri Lanka 1070 Sri Lankans 
arriving by boat in Australia under the enhanced screening process (Australian 
Human Rights Commission 2013b, Evidence to Senate Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs Legislation Committee 2013, p. 36). Since individual decisions made under 
the enhanced screening process are not made public, it is difficult to gauge what 
kind of opportunity each applicant was given to articulate a desire to seek 
protection, or present any kind of relevant supporting material in order to be 
screened in. Nonetheless, in outlining the limited details available about the 
process, Taylor reports that during the interview, ‘interviewees are asked: “what 
are your reasons for coming to Australia?” and, “do you have any other reasons for 
                                                 
16 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for drawing out this idea.  
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coming to Australia?”’ (Taylor 2013). Then, if the interviewee claims they are 
fleeing from harm, ‘follow-up questions are asked to probe the claim further’ 
(Taylor 2013). Taylor rightly argues that since ‘follow up questions’ are asked, this 
involves ‘an assessment of whether protection claims are credible and well-founded’ 
(Taylor 2013). This is the case even though the only concern in relation to 
screening-in protocols should be whether protection claims are being made; the 
screening-in decision should not involve an evaluation of the claim. 
Greg Lake, a former Immigration Department official who was involved in the 
process, confirms Taylor’s account of the interview and highlights just how specific 
an applicant must be in order to invoke a protection claim under the enhanced 
process, writing that: 
[I]f they say, 'I've run for my life because this government is persecuting me, 
because I'm a Tamil', for example, that's the kind of thing we'll go and explore with 
further questions … But if they didn't say anything along those lines ... if the 
question is asked and nothing is invoked, at times it can be done in one question, 
which I think is very dangerous… (Cooper 2013). 
Australian commentators have criticised the enhanced screening process as 
breaching Australia’s international and non-refoulement obligations (Taylor 2013, 
Howie 2013). Alongside this important critique, the process should also be 
understood as a manifestation of procedural reforms that have curtailed the rights 
of refugee applicants to present their claims and have them reviewed. Like the 
Canadian DCO and timeline reforms, Australia’s enhanced screening process is 
productively analysed in the context of acceleration and truncation. In the rhetoric 
of the Australian Government, the ‘screening out’ of certain persons is not just a 
process, but also an ‘enhanced’ one. It is significant that the Government wishes to 
characterise its peremptory screening practice as a process at all. Here, just as with 
the Canadian ‘safe country lists’, enhancing or improving the process primarily 
entails making it faster and more efficient. Processing bodies are expected to strive 
towards goals of efficiency and economy. As a consequence, the asylum seeker is 
denied the ability to articulate his or her claim but the claim is nonetheless 
‘processed’ and shielded from further review.  
Alongside the capacity of enhanced screening processes to limit asylum seekers’ 
ability to articulate their claims, there is also evidence that applicants conveying a 
prima facie need for protection have been screened out. Greg Lake, the former 
official involved in enhanced screenings, publicly expressed a concern that 
legitimate asylum seekers had been turned back as a result of the screening 
interview (Cooper 2013). An Australian journalist tracked the case of a Vietnamese 
woman and her family, who were screened out and informed of their imminent 
deportation before advocates intervened. After the intervention, but still on the 
strength of their original interview, the family was screened back in (Olle 2013b). 
Concerns about such practices sparked an application for an injunction to stop the 
deportation of 57 Sri Lankans who had been ‘screened out’ in December 2012. After 
the High Court granted the injunction and signaled that it would seek information 
about each of the Sri Lankans, the Minister for Immigration advised that their 
claims would be processed and that no further action was necessary to halt their 
removal (Lee 2012). However, no major amendment of the policy has followed as a 
result. 
In July 2014, the Australian Government interdicted two boats carrying 198 asylum 
seekers. 41 Sri Lankans aboard one of the vessels had their claims ‘processed’ at 
sea under the enhanced screening policy (Minister for Immigration and Border 
Protection 2014). All but one of the 41 claims were rejected and all those onboard 
were directly returned to Sri Lanka (Whyte 2014). This very high profile instance of 
enhanced screening was widely criticised (Laughland and Dehghan 2014). It was 
revealed applicants had been asked ‘four questions’ via teleconference while on the 
high seas, before having their claims assessed, an even more limited ‘process’ than 
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previous enhanced screening practices. The questions included the asylum seeker’s 
name, their country of origin, where they had come from and why they had left 
(Whyte 2014). The UNHCR, among many others, expressed ‘deep concern’ about 
the legality of the transfer, and at the time of writing the matter of CPCF v Minister 
for Immigration and Border Protection & Anor (S169/2014) is before the Australian 
High Court, challenging the legality of the prolonged at sea detention of the second, 
intercepted boat (Laughland and Denghan 2014).17   
As with the Canadian reforms, gender guidelines addressing the particular problems 
women claimants face at determination hearings have clearly not been incorporated 
into Australia’s enhanced screening procedures. The existing Australian Gender 
guidelines, for example, explicitly set the ‘difficulty an applicant may have in 
discussing his or her experiences of persecution because of shame or trauma’ 
(Refugee and Migration Review Tribunal 2010, section 14). A similar warning about 
late disclosure and shame exists in the Canadian guidelines (Immigration and 
Refugee Board 1996, section D(1)). The Canadian guidelines also suggest that in 
some cases it will be appropriate to consider whether claimants ‘should be allowed 
to have the option of providing their testimony outside the hearing room by 
affidavit or by videotape’ (Immigration and Refugee Board 1996, section D(3)). The 
Australian guidelines reinforce the need to create ‘an open and reassuring 
environment to establish trust and encourage the disclosure of personal 
information’ where gender-related claims are made (Refugee and Migration Review 
Tribunal 2010, section 17).  
It is obvious that the above guidelines and directions will have no place within 
enhanced screening procedures. Criticisms of the UK’s DFT process included that 
the speed of the process essentially created a ‘refusal factory’ for female applicants, 
especially those who did not disclose the sexual violence at the centre of their 
claims (Cutler 2007). These observations are germane to the ‘enhanced’ screening 
process, where the applicant must articulate a claim immediately in order to enter 
the determination process.  
Like Canada, the aim of the Australian process is one of reducing and limiting the 
number of successful asylum claims and this is enacted via procedural reforms. A 
media release of Tony Abbott, prior to his election as Prime Minister, stated that his 
party would ‘deny permanent residency through a robust new assessment regime 
and the reintroduction of temporary protection visas’ (Abbott 2013). The media 
release also stated that his ‘Coalition will put those who deliberately seek to 
frustrate our refugee assessment process not at the back of the queue, but out of 
the queue altogether’ (Abbott 2013).18 
At the time of writing in 2014 the House of Representatives had passed the 
Migration and Maritime Powers Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy 
Caseload) Bill 2014. The Bill proposes an expansive and diverse package of 
reforms, which includes among other things the acceleration of the refugee status 
determination process in Australia, and the removal or exclusion of merits review 
for certain groups of asylum seekers.19 As at October 2014, the Senate Legal and 
                                                 
17 The passengers aboard one of the boats were detained by the Australian government on the high seas 
for four weeks, before being transferred to the Australian offshore processing centre in Nauru (Doherty 
2014).  
18 In the same press release, Tony Abbott characterised the existing RSD process in Australia as ‘a tick 
and flick’ system of assessment where 90 per cent of ‘illegal boat arrivals’ are ‘receiving permanent 
visas’ (Abbott 2013). 
19 The Bill sets out that acceleration procedures will be applied to applicants who arrived irregularly by 
boat or plane after August 2012. These ‘fast track applicants’ will only be entitled to merits review on the 
papers. A further limitation on review will apply to another subset within this group named, ‘excluded 
fast review track applicants.’ This group will not be entitled to merits review at all and will include 
applicants arriving after August 2012 who are assessed as: having submitted a bogus document in 
support of their claim without reasonable explanation; or who have a manifestly unfounded claim; or 
who have been refused protection elsewhere; or those who are deemed to have passed through a safe 
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Constitutional Affairs was conducting an inquiry into the bill, and its passage 
through the Australian Senate remained uncertain.  
The Bill reflects a policy promise of the current government to speedily resolve a 
large number of outstanding asylum claims and to introduce temporary protection 
visas in Australia (Abbott 2013). The proposed reforms do not accelerate first 
instance determinations. However, their proposal to exclude or remove access to 
administrative review of decisions for certain applicants will have a significant 
effect, as first instance decisions are generally made extremely quickly. In 2012-13, 
for example, 51 per cent of all first instance determinations were made within 90 
days, and in 2011-12, the median number of days to determine primary cases was 
44 days (Department of Immigration and Citizenship 2013, Outcome 2).  
The aims of enhanced screening, as a mode of silencing and excluding refugee 
applicants, is reinforced in light of reports that former Australian Prime Minister 
Julia Gillard put pressure on the Department of Immigration to deport as many Sri 
Lankans as possible as part of the process, with an expectation that up to 400 Sri 
Lankans arriving by boat could be sent back to Colombo per week (Cooper 2013). 
Also, comments made by Australian Immigration Minister Scott Morrison, indicated 
that the Government believed that the percentage of ‘screen outs’ achieved was too 
low since ‘prior to the election, only one in five Sri Lankans were screened out and 
returned by the previous government’ and the new Government did not plan to deal 
in half measures and planned to take ‘a much stronger position on these issues’ 
(Olle 2013b).  
In addition to the silencing or foreclosing of asylum seekers’ ability to speak, Reilly 
and La Forgia (2013) argue that ‘enhanced screening’ and other procedural moves 
that enforce secrecy in relation to asylum seekers affect the ability of ‘the public’ to 
discuss matters, particularly cruelty and harm, that relate to asylum seekers. They 
argue that because ‘democracy is government through communication’, secret pre-
screening processes prevent democratic deliberation and shift the capacity for 
moral responsibility away from the polity and to the government and the executive 
(Reilly and La Forgia 2013, p. 144). Hastened, secret dealings with asylum seekers 
entail that the pubic loses it ability to speak competently about onshore refugees 
and their treatment (Reilly and La Forgia 2013, p. 144). While the focus of this 
piece is not the relationship between RSD processing and democratic governance, 
Reilly and La Forgia’s concerns echo claims made by critical race and feminist 
theorists, who argue that we construct social reality by devising and sanctioning 
certain stories over others, and that marginalised groups challenge ‘official’ or legal 
stories about them by providing ‘counter’ stories that reflect their experiences and 
subject positions (Delgado 1989, Ewick and Silbey 1995).  
The direct consequence of enhanced screening is that select groups of asylum 
seekers in Australia will be given the most limited opportunity to date to present 
their claims. Their applications will then be denied because no claim is evident, or 
because their claim has been unsuccessfully made out. As a result, these applicants 
will be constructed as illegitimate or fraudulent refugee applicants. And, the need to 
remove allegedly ‘fraudulent’ or bogus asylum seekers from the system was of 
course at the centre of justifications for these reforms at their outset.  
5. Conclusion 
The Australian and Canadian governments have each characterised the success of 
the reforms discussed in this piece in terms of their ability to deter onshore refugee 
applicants. Although the reforms were each introduced against a backdrop of 
improving the efficiency of RSD, in each instance their success has been measured, 
at least in part, in relation to deterrence rates. Soon after Bill C-31’s introduction, 
                                                                                                                                               
third country or to have had access to effective protection elsewhere: Migration and Maritime Powers 
Amendment (Resolving the Asylum Legacy Caseload) Bill 2014. 
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Canadian Minister for Immigration Jason Kenney commented that the reforms were 
already successful as they have had fewer people applying and those who did apply 
were achieving a lower success rate (Kenny 2013). In Australia, the Government 
set enhanced screening targets, which aimed to reduce the number of onshore 
refugee applicants through fast screening out procedures (Taylor 2013).  
The two packages of reform exemplify a pattern of accelerated RSD processes in 
refugee-receiving states. By denying asylum seekers the time and space to gather 
and articulate their stories and then rejecting claims due to a lack of credible 
evidence, the new procedures reinforce claims that refugee applicants are 
illegitimate and fraudulent. When asylum seekers’ claims are rejected, these 
rejections are used to signal the ‘correctness’ of excluding such applicants and of 
the reforms that achieve these exclusions. These diminished processes ‘let’ 
applicants into an ultimately procedurally unfair system, and then use the increased 
chance of a negative outcome to both physically and rhetorically exclude them. 
These procedural reforms, that speed up and truncate RSD, not only enact the 
exclusion of certain refugee applicants. The changes also dismiss and undo decades 
of reform that have attempted to recognise the unique difficulties faced by certain 
kinds of applicants, namely women and applicants making gender and sexuality 
based claims, as well as applicants with histories of trauma and torture. The 
analyses of fast-tracking reforms in the UK and Netherlands confirm that those 
making gender-based claims will be among those most excluded as a consequence 
of reforming RSD using speed, economy and efficiency as primary goals and 
outcomes.  
Macklin has described the phenomenon of the ‘disappearing refugee’. By this she 
does not mean that asylum seekers are no longer coming to the territories of 
wealthy industrial states. Rather, that a series of discursive moves and the 
conjunction of legal and popular cultures have eroded the idea that those who seek 
onshore asylum might actually be refugees (Macklin 2005, p. 101). Macklin’s 
observations hold true in relation to contemporary procedural reforms of RSD, 
which attempt to vanish genuine refugees from the territory of Western States. To 
date, scholars have observed and critiqued a culture of disbelief within refugee 
decision-making and identified credibility assessment as a major barrier to 
accessing protection. With refugee processing reforms, the disbelief has been 
shifted to restricting applicants’ access to RSD at all, and ultimately has created a 
fast and efficient means of exclusion for the many claimants who make it ‘in’ but 
fail to meet the new procedural strictures and deadlines imposed on them.  
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